Wednesday, 20 March 2019

Jehovah's Witnesses: Neglected Victims of Persecution



On March 18, 2019 Sergei Skrynnikov, a Russian and allegedly a Jehovah’s Witness, was charged with “participating in an extremist organization,” an offence under Russian law that could earn him up to six years in prison.  https://www2.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/190318a.html .  Jehovah’s Witnesses have been fleeing Russia and seeking asylum in Germany and Finland to escape such harsh sentences. https://www2.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/190127c.html  On February 6, 2019 a Russian court sentenced a Danish citizen who was legally resident in Russia to six year in prison for such extremist offense as organizing other Witnesses to shovel snow from their church’s property. https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/02/06/russia-jehovahs-witness-convicted

In China, state authorities harass Jehovah’s Witnesses and raid their meetings. Authorities also deport foreign Witness missionaries from countries such as South Korea. https://bitterwinter.org/jehovahs-witnesses-hunted-down-and-deported/ .

South Korea has only recently dropped a 2003 law prohibiting conscientious objection to fighting in its armed forces, a law that confined young Witness men—as well as others—to jail. https://www.economist.com/asia/2019/02/09/south-koreas-conscientious-objectors-escape-military-conscription

All these states violate international laws that protect religious freedom, including the freedoms of unpopular minorities. Article 18, 1 of the 1976 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protects everyone’s freedom to “have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice” and “to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.”

A Long History of Persecution

Jehovah’s Witnesses were among the first groups the Nazis persecuted. There were about 25,000 to 30,000 Witnesses in Germany in 1933. About half of those who did not flee were convicted of various crimes and between 2,000 and 2,500 were sent to concentration camps, where about 1,000 died. About 250 were also executed. Some years ago I met a Jehovah’s Witness in Hamilton, Ontario, where I live, who told me the Nazis had beheaded his grandfatherGermany’s Jehovah’s Witnesses were not merely passive religious group that refused to adopt the Nazi ideology: they also actively tried to expose Nazi atrocities.



In the 1960s and 70s in the East Africa country of Malawi, entire villages of Jehovah’s Witnesses were burned, and many villagers were raped, tortured, or murdered as they tried to flee. Their crime was refusal to participate in rituals of loyalty to the newly-independent Malawian state and its President, Hastings Banda. The government of Malawi denied me a visa in the early 1980s when I told two officials at its High Commission in Ottawa that I wanted to know what had happened to these Witnesses.

Many Witnesses in Rwanda, both Tutsi and Hutu, lost their lives during the 1994 genocide, many trying to hide people at risk of being murdered.  Even now, Rwandan authorities expel some Witness children from school and have fired some Witness teachers because they refuse to sing the national anthem or participate in religious training. https://www.jw.org/en/news/legal/by-region/rwanda/jehovah-witness-facts/

Persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Canada

Here in Canada, Jehovah’s Witnesses have not always enjoyed their rights to freedom of religion and expression.

During WWII Witness children were banned from schools in several Canadians locations in Canada because they would not salute the flag, sing the national anthem or repeat the pledge of allegiance. A Witness father sued the Hamilton Board of Education on behalf of his two sons, who had been expelled from school in 1940. In 1945, the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled in favour of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, saying the Board was required to excuse students from participating in religious exercises to which their parents objected. https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/1945/1945canlii117/1945canlii117.html

In the 1940s and 50s Premier Maurice Duplessis of Quebec persecuted Jehovah’s Witnesses, mainly because their public missionary activities offended the province’s Roman Catholics. When almost a thousand young Jehovah’s Witnesses were arrested and fined $40.00 each (a large sum at the time) a Witness restaurant owner named Frank Roncarelli paid their fines so that they could return to the streets and continue trying to make converts. In response, Duplessis stripped Roncarelli of his liquor license, ending his business. Roncarelli sued Duplessis and the case eventually went to Canada’s Supreme Court, which in 1959 ruled in favour of Roncarelli (the two judges from Quebec dissenting).  https://www.lawnow.org/whatever-happened-to-roncarelli-v-duplessis/

Even now, Jehovah’s Witnesses run the risk that they will be attacked while conducting their missionary work, a central obligation of their faith. Many people object to Jehovah’s Witnesses who come to their door trying to convert them.  Some go so far as to attack them, set their dogs on them, or even pull guns on them.

Jehovah’s Witnesses aren’t perfect. Among other things, church elders have been accused of covering up child abuse. https://www.ucobserver.org/justice/2018/01/jw/ But no other religious group is perfect either, especially when it comes to child abuse. 

There is no reason to persecute—or tolerate persecution of—Jehovah’s Witnesses. They are equal citizens, protected by national and international laws regarding freedom of religion.  









Thursday, 21 February 2019

How to Sell Basic Income: Guest Blog by Marc Zwelling


How to sell basic income: guest blog by Marc Zwelling
Note: I am very interested in the debate about basic income in Ontario. Our former Liberal government started an experiment paying people a basic income in three cities, including Hamilton, where I live, but the current Conservative government has cancelled the experiment. For a video and article about how people are being affected by the cancellation, go to https://globalnews.ca/news/4791459/photo-exhibit-ontario-basic-income-pilot/
 Unfortunately, I do not know enough about what people think about basic income to write a blog about it.  My friend Marc Zwelling does, though.  Marc  is president of Vector Research + Development Inc. /The Vector Poll™, a Canadian market and opinion research service. He is the author of Public Opinion and Polling For Dummies, published by Wiley. Marc has also taught strategy, planning and innovation at York University’s executive development  program. The blog below was originally published in The Hamilton Spectator on January 31, 2019: the Spectator shares copyright with its op-ed authors, so Marc has permission to publish the article on my blog as well.
Marc Zwelling

How to Sell Basic Income
Utopians often imagined a world without jobs. Some hoped automation would bring a leisure society. Some were afraid machines would do all our work and leave us impoverished.
Canadians are suspicious of technological progress. In a 1983 Decima Research poll 72% agreed automation will lead to “high unemployment.” In a 2016 Angus Reid Institute poll, 63% agreed “new technology is likely to eliminate more jobs than it creates.”
Abacus Data asked about the impact of artificial intelligence and automation on “future economic prospects” in a 2017 poll. While 50% said the impact will be more helpful, 50% said more harmful.
Anxiety over the future of work isn’t new. In the early 19th century, the rioting Luddites in Nottingham, England destroyed the textile machines that were replacing them.
After manufacturers installed the first assembly-line robots, in a 1979 book, The Collapse of Work, British union leader Clive Jenkins forecast “tidal waves of technological unemployment."
Today’s employment forecasters expect more technology will mean fewer jobs. A typical outlook, by the University of Toronto’s Mowat Centre in 2016, predicts “automation, combined with other trends in employment” will eliminate 1½ to 7½ million jobs in Canada in the coming 10 to 15 years — up to one in every five jobs.
The job-killing potential of new technology has revived interest in having governments guarantee everyone a basic income. The right-wing Fraser Institute commented in 2015 that the idea was receiving “renewed attention” and had support “across the ideological spectrum.
Polls show that Canadians want only the needy to have a basic income, not everyone. In five surveys between 1975 and 1995 conducted by Lethbridge University sociologist Reginald Bibby, from 84% to 91% agreed “people who are poor have a right to an income adequate to live on.”
In seven polls conducted by Environics between 1980 and 1991, from 66% to 77% favoured “the government providing a guaranteed annual income for all people who have incomes falling below an established poverty line. 
In 2017, however, when Ipsos asked if the government should pay “all residents” a “basic income in the form of free and unconditional money in addition to any income received from elsewhere,” only 44% agreed. Another 31% disagreed while 24% were unsure.
In the Angus Reid Institute survey in 2018, 59% said giving everyone “a minimum sum of money every month to live on” is a good idea, but only 21% said it’s a “very good idea.”
The guaranteed income is the Godot of Canadian politics. Like the characters in Samuel Beckett's play, people wait for the universal basic income. Some expect it’s imminent. Writing for iPolitics in 2017, journalist Susan Delacourt said a guaranteed basic income “could well become the sleeper issue in Canadian politics in 2017.”
But there’s no pressure on politicians to enact a basic income because Canadians are deeply ambivalent about it. One barrier is the public’s impression that it would cost too much.
In the 2016 Angus Reid Institute survey, 34% were willing to pay “more in taxes” to support “some kind of guaranteed income.” But 59% felt it would be “too expensive for Canada’s government to afford.”
The Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives says a universal basic income “raising everyone’s income above the poverty line” would cost $30 billion a year. The Parliamentary Budget Officer estimated in 2018 it would cost $76 billion but save the government $33 billion, so the net yearly outlay would be $43 billion.
To put that in perspective, the government’s projected budget deficit in 2018-19 for all its programs is $18.1 billion
The biggest obstacle to a basic income program, however, isn’t the cost. It’s the public’s concern about the work ethic.The Fraser Institute says basic-income experiments prove that giving people money discourages them from working and “could foster long term dependency on government transfers with widespread effects on the economy.” The public generally concurs.
In the 2016 Angus Reid Institute poll 63% agreed that guaranteed income programs “discourage people from working.” And 52% agreed “if you don’t work you don’t deserve an income.” In the 2017 Ispos survey, 60% agreed a basic income “will make people reliant on the state for income” while 54% said it would “discourage people from being in or seeking paid employment.”
If a basic income is a disincentive to work, what’s wrong with that? With the prospect of technology-driven massive job losses, dissuading people from working would be a good policy.
Stagnant pay and unemployment are the result of too many people chasing too few jobs. Paying people not to work would shrink the labour supply and lift wages. It might force employers to automate more jobs, which would rev up innovation and boost productivity (higher productivity, economists say, leads to higher profits and wages).
Advanced economies already pay some people for not working. Millions of retirees in their 60s and 70s live on their employer-based pensions though many are physically able to work.
To convince a skeptical public, advocates need to reconceive the universal basic income to match public opinion. Canadians want a guaranteed income that’s earned or deserved. A basic income Canadians would support would be a reward for initiative and effort, like a commission, a tip or a bonus.


Tuesday, 18 December 2018

Forcible Sterilization of Indigenous Women


Forcible Sterilization of Indigenous Women: One More Act of Genocide

In November 2018 it was reported that a group of Indigenous women in the Canadian province of Saskatchewan had brought a class-action suit against the Saskatoon Health Authority, the provincial and federal governments, and some medical professionals. These women complained that they had been forcibly sterilized, or tricked into giving consent for sterilization when they were under stress or heavily drugged. They claimed that doctors did this over several decades, as late as the 2000s.
Saskatoon

The UN Committee on Torture has become interested in this suit, recommending in late 2018 that the Canadian government investigate all allegations of enforced sterilization and adopt legislation criminalizing it. Indigenous activists want a new law specifically outlawing forced sterilization, but the federal government argues it’s already illegal.

Canada doesn’t have a good history with regard to forced sterilization. The provinces of Albert and British Columbia forcibly sterilized people from the 1930s to the 1970s. Authorities were responding to the eugenics movement, popular among many influential Canadians. Eugenicists wanted to keep the Canadian “race” pure by sterilizing “unfit” people, which usually meant poor people, immigrants, and people with disabilities. Indigenous peoples were at disproportionate risk of sterilization. During the last few years of forcible sterilization in Alberta, Indigenous and Metis people constituted 2.5 per cent of the population but twenty-five per cent of the people sterilized.

Forced sterilizations are an aspect of genocide. We tend to think of genocide as the mass, deliberate murder of large numbers of people. But when the United Nations formulated its Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide  in 1948, it defined five ways genocide could be committed.

Only one of the five means defined in the Genocide Convention is mass murder. The others are “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group,” “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part,” “imposing measures intended to prevent births with the group,” and “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”  

Forced sterilization is a means to impose measures to prevent births. The “Sixties Scoop” (in the 1960s) removing thousands of Indigenous children from their families and communities, ostensibly to protect the children from abusive situations, is an example of forcibly transferring children from one group to another.

Forcible deportations are a way to deliberately inflict conditions calculated to bring about a group’s physical destruction. Canada deported several indigenous groups in the far north from their homelands to various other locations, sometimes without any food or shelter, forcing them to live “off the land” in conditions so difficult as to cause many deaths from starvation, exposure and disease. (See my post of June 18, 2018: “Genocide in the Far North: Canada 1950”) Any removal of Indigenous people anywhere in the country that resulted in a significant number of deaths might be considered genocide by deportation. 

The term genocide was originally coined in 1944 by a Polish Jewish lawyer, Raphael Lemkin. Lemkin wanted to include what we now call cultural genocide in the definition. He wasn’t thinking about Indigenous peoples; he was thinking of the cultural genocide of ethnic groups such as Estonians by the Nazis. He thought destruction of works of culture that represented “the genius” of a group should be a crime called vandalism, and destruction of a religious or national collectivity should be a crime called barbarism.

Although Lemkin lobbied hard for the UN to accept his definition, in the end it didn’t. If it had, we could argue that the establishment of residential schools, with their explicit policies of depriving Indigenous children of their languages, customs and cultures--as well as removing them from their communities--was an aspect of genocide, the barbarism of destroying a collectivity. We use the term cultural genocide as a descriptive term, but it isn’t part of the UN’s legal definition.

Legally speaking, moreover, the UN definition requires proof of intent to commit genocide. So if Canadian authorities didn’t intend that Indigenous women should be sterilized: if those sterilizations were the accumulated, taken-for-granted practice of many doctors over many decades, then legally, Canada wasn’t committing genocide by preventing births. Similarly, if there was no intent to destroy a community by forcibly transferring children, then the Sixties Scoop wasn’t genocide. And if there was no intent to deliberately inflict conditions of life calculated to bring about peoples’ physical destruction by deporting Indigenous peoples, then Canada wasn’t committing genocide.

But as citizens, we might want to consider our moral responsibility as well as governments’ legal responsibilities. If we add up all the ways that our governments have oppressed Indigenous peoples over the centuries, then those of us who are not Indigenous bear a weighty burden, to remedy practices that in effect, if not in intent, constituted genocide.

Thursday, 29 November 2018

70 Years of International Human Rights


70 Years of International Human Rights

December 10, 2018 is the 70th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed in 1948 by the United Nations General Assembly. Since then an enormous body of international human rights laws has been developed.

Some people think that human rights should not be universal.

Some critics believe that human rights are an example of Western cultural imperialism. They claim that non-Western countries did not participate in drafting the Universal Declaration. Yet non-Western countries have been involved since the earliest stages in drawing up human rights documents. This is so even if, like Western countries, they are quite hypocritical when it comes to applying the laws they agree to.

Other critics argue that human rights promote selfish individualism. Instead of caring for the family or community, people only care for their own rights. But in countries like Canada where human rights are by and large respected, it’s only because citizens do have a sense of community and care for each other. Housing advocates, food bank workers, and millions of volunteers help make human rights “work” on the ground.

Yet other commentators claim that as China and other non-democratic countries become more powerful, human rights will be less important internationally. It is true that such countries will work to undermine many human rights, at home and at the UN. But that makes human rights more relevant, not less. We all need protection against abusive governments.

Human rights are still relevant, and new rights are evolving. 

One recent sign of progress is in LGBT rights. This topic is difficult to discuss internationally, because some African and Middle Eastern countries are still very homophobic, as are some religious groups, in the Western world and elsewhere. We don’t yet have an international declaration on LGBT rights, but the UN is paying more attention to them.

In the last twenty years, much attention has been paid to “collective” human rights. These are rights than belong to groups of people and that one individual can’t exercise if others can’t also exercise them.

Indigenous rights are collective rights. Indigenous peoples cannot live together as collectivities if their ways of life, languages, religions, cultures, and land bases are threatened. In 2007 the UN passed UNDRIP, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Canada voted against the Declaration, but later reversed its position. By 2016 the government declared its full support for UNDRIP.

A collective right that affects everyone everywhere is the right to a clean and healthy environment. This includes the right to protection against climate changes that undermine our livelihoods and well-being.   

Another collective right is the right to peace. Viewed narrowly, this is the right not to live in a state of war. In 2018, many people still live in war-torn countries, especially in the Middle East and Africa. Others, as in Ukraine, live in fear of war. And we all live in fear of nuclear war.

Both climate change and war create huge refugee populations. By 2050, it’s thought, there will be 200 million “climate refugees” fleeing rising sea levels. Add to that the refugees who are fleeing large-scale crime, like the Central American migrant caravan currently trying to get into the US.

The UN recently agreed on a Global Compact for Migration, setting out voluntary principles meant to save lives and ensure successful migrant integration into new countries without unduly burdening social infrastructure such as health care. But the real problem is to ensure people don’t have to leave home at all.

One way to ensure more people stay at home is by developing their economies. The right to development is a collective right. Development activists usually try to reduce both poverty and inequality. There’s been an enormous reduction in world poverty over the last 25 years, even as inequality has been growing in most countries. This means it’s easier to fulfill what is known as economic human rights, such as rights to health, education, and housing. Very little of this change results from foreign aid; most is a result of the spread of market economies.

Many people in many countries have benefited from globalization, though others, such as industrial workers in Canada and the US, have lost their jobs. This is one of the reasons for the spread of anti-immigrant, anti-foreigner sentiments in the Western world. Unless we can figure out a way to control these sentiments and reduce the need for people to flee their own countries because of war, crime, and climate change, we are facing an uneasy human rights future.


Tuesday, 20 November 2018


The End of the Cognitive Empire by Boaventura de Sousa Santos: Book Note
Note: This is a revised version of an academic book review that will be published in Human Rights Quarterly: I am including it on my blog with the permission of Bert Lockwood, HRQ’s Editor. I’ve removed footnotes, but can supply the footnoted version to readers on request; email me at hassmann@wlu.ca .


This volume is an exemplar of a new kind of academic literature that denigrates the universality of human rights, seen by the author as an imperialist concept that denies the particularity of suffering in the South. Santos is a sociologist of epistemology, the science of knowledge, who relies on a conceptual opposition of the “South” and its systems of epistemologies, to the “North” or “West” (used interchangeably). This opposition is a metaphor for two kinds of thinking; the North rational, scientific, objective, aggregative, globalizing and imperialist, committing epistemicide on the emotional, corporeal, subjective, particularist, local, and resistant epistemologies of the South. Santos’ purpose is to “de-monumentalize” the North’s bloodless and emotionless system of scientific knowledge, compared to “knowledges” from the South. An “abyssal line,” he claims, separates the two areas.

Santos does not explain what “knowledges” means; perhaps scholars familiar with the critical literature on epistemology do not need such instruction. It appears that whatever a Southern individual might think or claim to know is an epistemology or “knowledge” in itself. Thus people from the South have multiple, indeed millions, of knowledges while the North--confined as it is to reason-based thinking epitomized by well-known philosophers and (social) scientists--is confined to one ”knowledge.”

Nor does Santos explain what exactly an “abyssal line” means. It appears to apply to the Indigenous and Afro-descendant groups with whom he has worked in the actual geographical South, and whose situation one might readily agree is truly abyssal. Otherwise, the line seems to be wherever Santos puts it. The North enforces the line via the trilogy of capitalism, colonialism and patriarchy, although Santos concedes that some “satellite versions” of these phenomena sometimes exist in the South. Throughout, Santos refers to this trilogy in rote fashion, without analyzing whether their linkages are necessary or merely contingent.

It is difficult to argue against the empirical accuracy of Santos’ claims, because he specifically states that to him, the North and the South are not geographical regions. They appear, rather, to be mindsets. Santos’ North is rooted in Enlightenment philosophers’ stress on reason over emotion, on abstraction over concrete experience. His South is composed of people who struggle against oppression, who rely on experiences and emotions. If Santos approves of an epistemology or sociology, then it is Southern; if not, it is Northern. Nevertheless, his frequent references to Northern, Western, or Eurocentric ways of thinking or conducting research suggest that his usages of these terms are more than mere metaphors.
Boaventura de Sousa Santos

Santos posits a false opposition, between Northern thinkers and scientists and Southern people(s) engaged in struggle. His empirical references for evidence about Northern ways of thinking are the philosophers he cites in his footnotes. But very few real people in the geographical North actually read the philosophers that Santos claims created the modernist, Northern mindset. Most Northern individuals live their lives much as individuals in the South do, thinking with their emotions and feelings, celebrating joyously on some occasions; their reasoning is as much “warmed up” (Santos’ conception of corazonar) by experience and emotions as the reasoning of people living in the South. They live their knowledge much as Southerners do, albeit usually in much more comfortable circumstances.

Nor is it true that Northern philosophers created their ideas purely from whole cloth, unmindful of the corporeality of people’s lived experiences within their own bodies, a mindfulness that Santos claims is confined to the knowledges of the South. Philosophers of the past, like Northern human rights scholars and activists today, are well aware of the corporeality of victims of human rights abuses. That is why they oppose torture, rape, and murder, and why they promote economic human rights such as shelter, food, and health care, which protect the vulnerable body. According to Santos, though, these rights are irrelevant to people living below the abyssal line.

The North, says Santos, has neglected what he calls the “sociology of absences….” and the “sociology of emergences. This is not so: Northern sociologists have been dealing with absences for fifty years, since feminist scholars first began to note the absence of gender analysis. There has also been much attention to previous exclusions of race, indigeneity, and sexual orientation and identity from sociology and epistemology. Northern critical theorists of fifty years ago were not unaware of Fanon, Nkrumah, Freire, or many other Southern theorists/activists whose thought Santos analyses.
Santos particularly admires Gandhi, especially his synthetic approach to “knowledges” from the North and the South, a capacity for intercultural translation that Santos appears to believe is absent in the North. Yes despite his stress on the sociology of absences, Santos himself relegates to a footnote what he considers to have been Gandhi’s “complex” relations with the struggles of Dalits and the Adivasi (tribal) people.

And Santos does not mention at all Gandhi’s relations to women. Recent research (available since at least 2012) has confirmed that Gandhi slept naked with naked women, including his own grand-niece, in an attempt to show that he could resist sexual temptation. This peculiar practice was well-known during his lifetime but knowledge of it was suppressed after his death. This posthumous #MeToo information does not mean that Gandhi’s teachings are no longer relevant. But if an author purports to be concerned with patriarchy, then surely he should acknowledge his own sociological “absence” in ignoring the sexually exploitative, indeed incestuous, activities of one of his own epistemic heroes.

What does this book have to say to human rights scholars who are not concerned with the epistemology or sociology of knowledge? Not much. Santos rejects human rights and democracy for the South, claiming that such concepts were “developed by dominant social groups to reproduce domination.” They are useful concepts for “nonabyssal exclusions” in the North, he says, but they have no bearing elsewhere. It is difficult to understand why. Perhaps people engaged in struggle- especially the Indigenous and Afro-descendants communities among whom Santos himself has conducted research and for whom he has much sympathy—are so committed that they are willing to give up their lives, thus have no use for international laws or practices that might protect them from torture or arbitrary execution.

Santos also rejects Northern-based (if not all) NGOs, perhaps because they are committed to rational planning and other aspects of modernism. He views them as agents of capitalist, colonialist, and patriarchal domination, including a scathing paragraph listing the many failings of which some NGOs have been accused.

Santos’ recommendations for what he calls “rearguard” as opposed to “vanguard” intellectuals might have some bearing on some types of “post-abyssal” research; that is, by  researchers who wish to cross the abyssal line. Anthropologists and some sociologists studying human rights will no doubt agree that if they can live with and among the people they study and see the world through their eyes, they will be less guilty of “extractivist” research than if they merely visit a society, ask questions, and then disappear. Santos argues for long, discursive interviewing styles in which those being interviewed can raise whatever topics they wish, tell stories, and express their emotions to the researcher, as in his own research project on Voices of the World. Such a style of interviewing has been common in sociology for decades; it is known as open-ended, unstructured interviewing.   

If one accepts Santos’ theoretical premises, moreover, then that might lead one to conduct a new kind of human rights research, based in praxis, the unity of theory and action. The only legitimate researchers, according to Santos, are those who participate directly in struggle with the people about whom they are learning. Research in these conditions is co-creation of knowledge; there are no objects of research, only subjects; the objective is “knowing-with,” not “knowing-about.” In Canada, there have been lively discussions of the ethics of conducting research among Indigenous communities without their cooperation and input, for at least twenty years, reflecting precisely these concerns about scholarly extractivism. Researchers in the geographical North are as capable of self-reflexivity as researchers in the geographical South, but Santos might argue that those capable of self-reflexivity are therefore, by definition, part of his metaphorical South.

The type of research that Santos advocates is very different from that conducted by human rights lawyers for the purpose of building legal cases. In such circumstances, lawyers may have to ask questions that might shed light on abuses that violate international law, at the expense of the larger stories that victims might wish to tell. And not all struggles are confined to the local level. Some research requires aggregation, large-scale surveys, and statistical sophistication; statistics are not merely an example of Northern modernist empiricism. The method depends in part on the objective, and researchers can assist those struggling against oppression (but not, according to Santos, for their human rights) even if they are not embedded in the day-to-day lives of people of the South.

Santos’ personal commitment to the struggling communities of both the metaphorical and the geographical South is obvious and admirable, but he has created a false opposition of regions, mindsets, and epistemologies. Within his limited dichotomies, there are some ideas that human rights scholars and activists might find worth pondering. Unfortunately, the book is characterized by verbose, obscure and almost impenetrable language, reducing its value to those who do not devote their time to debates on the sociology of knowledge.



Wednesday, 14 November 2018

Free Speech in an Age of Massacres


Free Speech in an Age of Massacres

A few months ago I read Salman Rushdie’s 2012 memoir, Joseph Anton. Rushdie is the British author of Indian Muslim background against whom Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran issued a fatwa in 1989, calling for his death. In the Ayatollah’s view, Rushdie’s 1988 novel, The Satanic Verses, blasphemed Islam. Rushdie went into hiding, adopting the name Joseph Anton, after Joseph Conrad and Anton Chekhov. He survived, but several of his translators and editors worldwide were assassinated or injured.

One thing that shocked me reading this memoir was that more than one radical British Muslim had appeared on television supporting the death threat, saying that Rushdie should be killed. I was shocked that these individuals were not arrested for inciting violence. It seemed to me that when one British citizen publicly called for the murder of another British citizen, he should have been held to account. Perhaps the British authorities were afraid that if these individuals were arrested, protests would then worsen among segments of the British Muslim community.

I am equally shocked that it now seems fine for American citizens to call for other American citizens to be murdered. At Trump rallies in the last few weeks, crowds have yelled “shoot her” when Trump mentioned Nancy Pelosi, soon to be Democrat speaker of the House of Representatives. They also yelled “shoot her” when Trump mentioned Maxine Waters, a long-standing Congresswoman from California. This threat is much more serious, since Waters is an African-American. She was one of the targets of bombs that a Trump supporter sent to several prominent Democrats.

Trump is normalizing murders of African-Americans. Anyone who yells, “shoot her” (murder her) in a public place should be arrested and charged. This is more than hate speech. 

The (UN) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1969, Article 4) outlaws hate speech.  Hate speech is illegal in Canada, though the boundaries of what constitutes it are narrow. I am not a free speech absolutist: I think hate speech should be outlawed. We can’t pretend that all “bad speech” can be overcome or neutralized by “good speech.” We’re in a new world now. Lies, prejudice, and incitement to violence spread easily on the Internet, as much it seems on legitimate Internet sites as in the dark web.

This is why at the end of October 2018 there was much discussion in the Canadian press about whether the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the University of Toronto should have hosted a debate between David Frum, a Republican critic of Trump, and Steve Bannon, Trump’s former advisor and an advocate and organizer of right-wing populism in North America and Europe. The organizers of the debate said it was in the public interest to expose Bannon’s view directly to them. Critics argued he should not receive a platform. I was torn, though if the Munk School paid Bannon for his appearance, then I found that extremely unpalatable, as it would help him to promote his political agenda. 

Nevertheless, I worry about the likelihood that hate speech laws will be used to stymie legitimate speech. Last week (Nov. 8, 2018) I posted a blog about Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s apology to Canada’s Jewish community for our government’s anti-Semitic policies during WWII. In this apology, he denounced “BDS [boycott, divestment, and sanctions]-related intimidation” of Jewish students in Canada who, he said, were made to feel “unwelcome and uncomfortable on some of our college and university campuses.”

The Prime Minister rightly denounced anti-Semitism on campus by some BDS activists, without suggesting that the BDS movement as a whole is illegitimate. But this may not have been enough for some supporters of Israel, who think that the entire BDS movement is anti-Semitic and that its criticism of the state of Israel are forms of anti-Semitic hate speech that should be outlawed.

 And that’s the danger of hate speech laws. Incitement to violence is clear and should be stopped. Some kinds of hate speech, we also know, are calls to genocide, especially dehumanizing rhetoric that calls future victim groups vermin, as in Nazi Germany, or cockroaches, as in Rwanda in 1994. Whether incitement to genocide or to massacres of some citizens by others, as happened in Canada on January 29, 2017 against Muslims in Quebec City, and now happens with alarming frequency against African-Americans in the US, such speech should be penalized. So should speech and social media posts suggesting that Muslims should massacre non-Muslims for criticizing Islam or merely as acts of vengeance (see my blog on the Charlie Hebdo massacre in France, January 9, 2015).

On the other hand, it is legitimate for Canadian citizens to criticize the policies of a foreign state, even if many Canadians are emotionally attached to that state for reasons of religion or ethnicity. Sometime one person’s hate speech is another’s free speech: therein lies the rub. I wish I could think of a suggestion as to how to solve this problem.

Thursday, 8 November 2018

Trudeau apologizes to Canada's Jewish Community


Trudeau Apologizes to Canada’s Jewish Community


(please note: I published a shortened version of this blog in The Hamilton Spectator, November 10, 2018, p. A16)

Yesterday, (November 7, 2018) Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau delivered an apology in Parliament to Canada’s Jewish community for an event that occurred almost 80 years ago. 


Justin Trudeau
 In June 1939, Canada refused landing rights to the MS St. Louis, a ship carrying 907 German Jewish refugees. The ship had already been turned back from Cuba and the United States. Eventually it returned to Europe, where the refugees were dispersed among Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium and France. The latter three countries were later over-run by the Nazis, resulting in the deaths of 254 St. Louis passengers. Here’s the link to the video of the apology.




Passengers embarking on the St. Louis in Hamburg
 Trudeau’s apology was very well-crafted, presumably with input from leaders of Canada’s Jewish community. The Prime Minister set out the context of Canada’s past anti-Semitic policies very clearly. He acknowledged they had helped to facilitate the extermination of European Jews, since Hitler could see that despite their rhetorical denunciations, the future Allied countries did not want to help the Jews whom he was persecuting. 

Trudeau also explained the extent of anti-Semitism in Canada before and after WWII.  He acknowledged that by turning away the St. Louis’ passengers, as well as countless other Jews who tried and failed to find sanctuary in Canada, the country had deprived itself of much useful expertise and many productive citizens. He acknowledged the Jewish community’s contributions to Canada, including its commitment to charitable endeavors (an important statement, given anti-Semites’ belief that “Jews only help themselves.”) His delivery was sober, articulate and sincere. As someone who has studied official apologies as part of her academic career, I could not have asked for anything better.


I didn’t expect when I heard the apology that part of it would be, in effect, to me. The Prime Minister apologized for/to the “7000 Jewish prisoners of war” who, he said, were held in Canada with the very people who had persecuted them. He was referring not to POWs but to internees, Jews from enemy countries (Germany, Austria, and Hungary) who had been in Britain when the war began and were interned under the Enemy Aliens Act until they could be sorted out.  Once that had been done, many of the teenaged boys and younger men were sent to camps in Canada and Australia; some were sent on the same ships as Nazi POWs and some were held—at least initially—in the same camps as Nazi POWs. (My source for this is Eric Koch’s book, Deemed Suspect: A Wartime Blunder, published in 1980 by Methuen).

One of those 7000 Jews (or in his case, “half’-Jew”) was my own late father, who was sent to Canada and held in a camp near Sherbrooke, Quebec, from which he must have been released by late 1941, as he married my mother in Scotland in early 1942. I don’t think he would have been pleased to have been called a prisoner of war by the Prime Minister, such a designation implying that he had fought for an enemy country.  He hadn’t: he was a refugee who after his internment joined the British army.

I wonder as well whether father would have wanted or accepted this apology, had it been offered before he died in 1998. My own opinion, as a descendant to whom the apology was also offered, is that I am grateful for the Prime Minister’s acknowledgement that anti-Semitism was rife in Canada before, during and after the war. I’m also grateful that he acknowledges the extent of anti-Semitism now and promised to intensify efforts through the  Security Infrastructure Program to protect places of worship (not only Jewish: mosques and Hindu Temples, for example, clearly need more protection after the mass shooting in a Quebec City mosque on January 29, 2017 and the torching of a Hindu Temple in my own city of Hamilton in 2001). (On the latter, see my blog entry: https://rhodahassmann.blogspot.com/2014/10/terrorism-vs-mischief-canadas-double.html )

Trudeau also referred to the BDS (boycott, divestment and sanctions) movement against Israel and its apparent harassment of Jewish students on Canadian university campuses. The BDS movement is a legitimate protest against the Israeli government’s policies in the West Bank and Gaza, but it is not legitimate if it targets Jews as Jews. If Jewish students are harassed by activists in that group purely because they are Jewish, then that is anti-Semitism. I would not, for example, harass a Canadian Muslim to protest the actions of the Saudi government in Yemen and against its own citizens. Nor would I harass a Canadian Muslim of Pakistani descent to protest Pakistan’s discrimination against Christians.

The question might arise whether, eighty years after the event, Prime Minister Trudeau’s apology to the Canadian Jewish community actually matters. It does. It matters to some survivors of the St. Louis (one is still alive in Canada), and to the descendants of the St. Louis’s passengers. It may also matter to some people who were interned and their descendants.  It matters, presumably, to those members of Canada’s Jewish community who agitated for the apology. More broadly, it is an educative tool that informs all Canadians about the extent of anti-Semitism and the harm it has done and still does.




Tuesday, 16 October 2018

BOOK ANNOUNCEMENT: IN DEFENSE OF UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS

My latest book, in Defense of Universal Human Rights, is about to be released by Polity Press in the UK.  This is a short book suitable for teaching.  Some colleagues in the US and the UK have already received it.

Here is a detailed table of contents (no page numbers yet, as I have not yet received my own copy).

Introduction

Chapter 1. Universal Human Rights

Definition of Human Rights
Human Dignity
Origins of Human Rights
The International Law of Human Rights
Sovereignty versus Human Rights

 Chapter 2: Some Critical Perspectives on Human Rights

Human Rights as Western Liberalism
Abstraction versus Compassion
The Feminist Critique
Human Rights Law vs. Social Change
Critical Perspectives and Human Rights Universality

 Chapter 3: How Rights-Protective Societies Develop

Does the International Human Rights Regime Make Any Difference?
Market Economies
Civil Society and Political Action
Democracy and Political Institutions
Political Culture
Human Rights Regression
The Fragility of Human Rights

 Chapter 4: Civil and Political Rights

The Debate on Human Rights Priorities
The Strategic Value of Civil and Political Human Rights
The Intrinsic Value of Civil and Political Human Rights
The Right to Have Rights
Universal or Particular?

 Chapter 5: Culture and Community

Community and Responsibility
Community and Culture
Cultural Clashes
Freedom of Speech vs. Freedom of Religion
Social Collectivities: Indigenous Rights
The Necessity for Intra-Cultural Debates on Human Rights

 Chapter 6: Economic and Social Human Rights

Economic and Social Human Rights
Critiques of Economic and Social Human Rights
Globalization, Capitalism and Economic Human Rights
Inequality
Development Models and the Intersection of Human Rights
Cherry-Picking Human Rights

 Chapter 7: Collective Human Rights

Definition
Self-Determination
The Right to Development
Environmental Rights
The Right to Peace
Civil and Political Rights as the Basis for Collective Rights

Chapter 8: Western (Ir)responsibility for Human Rights in the Global South

International Justice
International Trade
Foreign Aid
Human Rights Non-Governmental Organizations
Human Rights in Foreign Policy
The Urgent Need for Universal Human Rights

Here is the blurb on the back cover.'

Should African and Muslim-majority countries be obliged to protect LGBT rights, even though they claim such rights violate their cultures?  Should Western-based corporations be held liable if their security guards kill union activists in Latin America?

Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann answers yes to both these questions.  She vigorously defends universal human rights, arguing that the entire range of rights is necessary for all individuals everywhere.  She especially defends civil and political rights such as the rights not to be tortured and the rights to vote, which are often so taken for granted as to be neglected. 

Howard-Hassmann grounds her defense of universality in her conception of human dignity, which she maintains must include personal autonomy, equality, respect, recognition, and material security. She argues that only social democracies can be considered fully rights-protective states. Other political systems such as communism, or minimally liberal or libertarian states, are not fully rights-protective.

Howard-Hassmann takes particular issue with scholars who argue that human rights are “Western,” quasi-imperialist impositions on states in the global South, and that the stress on individual rights undermines community and social obligation. She contends, to the contrary, that human rights support communities and can only be preserved if states and individuals observe their duties to protect human rights. Criticisms of human rights as “Western” confuse the practice of sovereignty by all states with some Western states’ hypocrisy in advocating for human rights elsewhere.